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What is convertible equity (or a convertible security)?

August 31, 2012 By Yokum 14 Comments

Quick answer: convertible equity (or a convertible security) is convertible debt without the repayment feature at maturity or interest.

Background

Over the past few years, convertible debt has emerged as a quick and inexpensive method for startup companies to raise money from angel investors and early stage venture funds.  Paul Graham sparked some commentary by declaring in a tweet in August 2010 that “Convertible notes have won. Every investment so far in this YC batch (and there have been a lot) has been done on a convertible note.”  In response, Seth Levine wrote a very thoughtful post on convertible debt versus equity.  Other folks, such as Mark Suster, have also written about whether convertible debt is preferable to equity.

Fred Wilson has been openly critical of convertible debt, and prefers priced equity rounds. Manu Kumar has also indicated that he prefers priced equity rounds to convertible debt.   Ted Wang believes that the “reason that capped convertible debt is the current market leader is that entrepreneurs have been conditioned over time to believe that convertible debt is (a) faster (b) cheaper and (c) better for them than equity investment.”  As a result, Ted introduced the Series Seed preferred stock documents as an alternative to convertible debt for early stage investments.

The problem

One major concern about convertible debt is that it eventually needs to be repaid if another round of financing doesn’t occur.  Originally, the concept of convertible debt was part of the VC playbook in order to “bridge” companies that needed financing in between round of equity financing — such as between Series A and Series B — in order to get to the next milestone to raise financing or sell the company.  This is why convertible debt is sometimes referred to as a “bridge loan.” If the company didn’t raise a round of financing, the convertible debt would convert into the last round of financing (i.e. Series A) or have to be repaid.

However, most typical convertible debt issued by startups have a maturity date of typically one year or later from the time of issuance.  At the maturity date, there is a risk that investors may demand repayment.  As a result of this risk, some people like Adeo Ressi, have declared that 2011 will be the “year of the startup default.” The theory is that the number of seed stage Series A deals led by venture capital firms is decreasing, meaning that it will be difficult for startups to raise a new round of financing.  In fact, Paul Graham wrote a letter to Y Combinator companies warning them that the performance of the Facebook IPO may hurt the market for early stage startups. There are likely thousands of startup companies (especially coming from incubators or accelerators) that have raised money using convertible debt — and many of these companies may default on payment.

On the other hand, some people, like Paul Graham, think that “this has never once been a problem.”  However, I believe that YC realizes that having debt outstanding that may need to be repaid is not a good situation for founders.  In fact, the form of convertible debt documents that YC recommends that their companies use has been recently revised to include a provision that forces a conversion of the debt into a pre-negotiated Series AA preferred stock upon the consent of a majority in interest of the convertible note holders.

One other related issue pointed out by Jason Mendelson is that convertible debt means that the company may be technically insolvent, and officers and directors may have enhanced duties to creditors (such as landlords), as some states may impose personal liability on directors for decisions that resulted in creditors not being paid.

The solution

In response to the concern that rogue investors might bankrupt companies by asking to be repaid when their debt is due and a lot of prodding by Adeo Ressi, I decided to modify convertible debt documents to remove the concept of repayment at maturity date and to remove interest.

These documents are available at the links below.

Form of Convertible Security Term Sheet

Form of Convertible Securities Purchase Agreement

Form of Convertible Security

The release of the documents was covered by Techcrunch, Venturebeat, Forbes and Fortune, as well as the Wall Street Journal.

Please note that I am not necessarily advocating a particular form of document.  There are some features in the sample documents that I like — such as the conversion discount being paid in common stock — that are in the form of convertible debt documents used by YC.  There are probably other features like optional conversion into common stock or a pre-negotiated preferred stock after a certain time frame that may be appealing to some companies and investors.  The main point is to re-think convertible debt so that it doesn’t have a repayment feature or interest.

Why convertible equity is better than convertible debt

1.  Convertible debt may need to be repaid.  The risk that an investor might demand repayment of a convertible note is eliminated with the convertible security.

2.  Convertible debt holders must be paid interest.  Convertible debt must have interest at the applicable federal rate (AFR) published by the IRS or higher, or the IRS will deem that the lender should have received imputed interest at AFR.  If convertible debt with a price cap is supposed to mimic the economics of equity, then removing interest seems logical.  (Of course, one may argue that some preferred stock financings contain a feature called cumulative dividends that is similar to interest on debt, but I find the provision to be fairly unusual in typical West Coast venture financings.)  In addition, when a financing occurs and the convertible debt converts, creating the spreadsheet to track interest on the notes to the penny, especially when notes have been issued on different days, ends up being a painful task — especially as the closing date of a financing may be delayed and the amount of interest increases, resulting in more shares being issued to note holders.

3.  Convertible equity is “equity” and probably can be characterized as qualified small business stock, which may have a tax benefit for investors.

4. Convertible debt with a maturity date longer than one year creates problems for California-based investors due to licensing requirements under the California Finance Lenders Law.  Making it equity removes this issue.

Why convertible equity is better than preferred stock

1.  All of the arguments that people make for convertible debt as superior to priced equity rounds are generally applicable.  I don’t necessarily agree with all of them, but I think the primary argument is simplicity of documents and legal cost.  Paul Graham also suggests that convertible debt is superior because it allows a company to easily provide different terms for different investors — for example, early investors may receive a lower price cap.

2. There are certain features that are commonly accepted in preferred stock financings that do not necessarily exist in typical convertible debt financings.  For example, the Series Seed documents contain limited protective provisions, a right of first offer on future financings, a board seat, and information rights. The YC Series AA documents contain similar provisions.  I’m not sure that founders really prefer to do convertible debt in order to avoid giving away these rights. I simply believe that angel investors don’t really think to ask for board seats and other rights (such as vetos on a sale of company, etc.) as they don’t care — or they trust the founders to do the right thing. I have seen convertible debt deals where extremely sophisticated early-stage investors load up convertible debt with protective provisions, pro rata rights, board seats, etc.

Conclusion

At the end of the day, I can’t think of a good reason not to shift early stage seed financings toward “convertible equity” away from “convertible debt.” I’d love to get feedback as to what people think.

Filed Under: Convertible note

Is crowdfunding legal?

May 26, 2012 By Yokum Leave a Comment

Below is an article that I wrote for Business Law Today, a publication for the American Bar Association’s Business Law Section.

Crowdfunding: Its Practical Effect May Be Unclear Until SEC Rulemaking is Complete

President Obama signed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (known as the JOBS Act) into law on April 5, 2012. One highly anticipated provision of the JOBS Act, Title III, is entitled ”Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act of 2012” or the ”CROWDFUND Act.” Title III enables “crowdfunding,” or the ability to sell securities in small amounts to a large number of investors.

Whether or not the crowdfunding provisions will have a significant impact on small business fundraising is yet to be determined. Despite the buzz among entrepreneur communities, various restrictions may make crowdfunding impractical for companies raising money and the intermediaries that facilitate the process. Most importantly, the crowdfunding provisions of the JOBS Act are not yet effective. On April 23, 2012, the SEC published guidance reminding issuers that “any offers or sale of securities purporting to rely on the crowdfunding exemption would be unlawful under federal securities laws” until the SEC adopts new rules.

Crowdfunding Prior to the JOBS Act

Crowdfunding is not a new concept. The Internet has made it easier for individuals and organizations to raise money for charitable purposes, political campaigns, artists seeking support from fans and various other projects. In 2005, Kiva launched a micro-finance platform that allows people to lend small amounts of money to entrepreneurs in developing areas. This lending model was further refined, and peer-to-peer lending companies like Prosper emerged in 2006 and Lending Club emerged in 2007. More recently, companies like Kickstarter have emerged to enable the public to fund creative projects ranging from independent films, video games, and food projects.

Prior to the JOBS Act, crowdfunding suffered from some several legal limitations. First, crowdfunding involving the sale of securities triggers the prohibitively expensive registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, as generally no exemptions are available in many crowdfunding models. Second, websites that facilitate crowdfunding may be subject to regulation as brokers.

As a result, current crowdfunding platforms have generally developed business models designed to avoid characterization as a sale of a security. Some companies utilize pure donation models. Companies like Kiva that provide micro-loans without interest and do not take commissions are arguably not offering securities because there is no expectation of profit on the part of the investors. Other companies like Kickstarter offer rewards or facilitate the pre-purchase of products. At the other extreme, because the SEC has taken the position that interest-bearing notes are securities, companies like Prosper and Lending Club have registered their offerings with the SEC.

Under pressure from Congress, the SEC agreed to review its regulations and their effect on capital formation in spring 2011. Crowdfunding received a boost when the Obama administration endorsed crowdfunding in September 2011. Although the SEC has the authority to exempt crowdfunding from the registration requirements of the Securities Act and to exempt intermediaries from registration as broker-dealers, Congress has forced the SEC to take action. The House of Representatives passed a crowdfunding bill in November 2011 and crowdfunding bills were introduced in the Senate in November 2011 and December 2011 that resulted in the crowdfunding provisions of the JOBS Act.

Crowdfunding Under the JOBS Act

Title III of the JOBS Act amends Section 4 of the Securities Act by adding a new paragraph (6), and requires the SEC to promulgate related rules to create an exemption from registration that permits a private company to sell securities in small amounts to large numbers of investors that are not accredited over a 12-month period.

Under the crowdfunding provisions, the aggregate dollar amount of securities that an issuer can sell in a crowdfunding transaction is limited to $1 million (less the aggregate amount of securities sold under other exemptions) over a 12-month period. In addition, the amount an issuer can sell to an individual investor in any 12-month period is limited to the maximum of:

• the greater of $2,000 or 5 percent of the annual income or net worth of an investor, if either the investor’s net worth or annual income is less than $100,000; and

• 10 percent, not to exceed $100,000, of annual income or net worth of an investor, if either the investor’s annual income or net worth is equal to or greater than $100,000.

Securities sold pursuant to the crowdfunding provisions are not transferable by the purchaser for one-year from the date of purchase, unless the securities are transferred to the issuer, an accredited investor, in a registered offering, or to family of the purchaser. The securities may also be subject to such other limitations as may be determined by the SEC.

Requirements on Intermediaries

An issuer must sell the securities in a crowdfunding offering through a broker or funding portal, which is required to register with the SEC and other applicable self-regulatory organizations.

These intermediaries need to meet a series of specific and restrictive requirements to be determined by the SEC. For example, intermediaries will be required to:

• provide investors with certain information (such as disclosures related to risks and other investor education materials);

• ensure that investors review the investor-education information, affirm their understanding of the risks and answer questions demonstrating an understanding of the risks;

• take measures to reduce the risk of fraud, including conducting background checks on officers, directors, and holders of more than 20 percent of the shares of issuers;

• make available to the SEC and potential investors the disclosure required to be provided by issuers not later than 21 days prior to the first day on with securities are sold;

• ensure that offering proceeds are provided to the issuer only when the target offering amount is reached or exceeded and allow investors to cancel their commitments;

• ensure that no investor in a 12-month period has purchased securities pursuant to the crowdfunding exemption that exceed the per-investor limits in the aggregate;

• take steps to ensure the privacy of information collected from investors;

• not compensate promoters, finders, or lead generators for providing the intermediary with the personal identifying information of any potential investor; and

• prohibit its directors, officers, or partners from having a financial interest in an issuer using its services.

The SEC is directed to establish rules that exempt funding portals from broker-dealer registration as long as they are subject to the authority of the SEC, are a member of a national securities association and are subject to other requirements the SEC may establish.

However, in order to qualify as a funding portal, the intermediary must not offer investment advice or recommendations; solicit purchases, sales, or offers to buy the securities offered on its website; compensate persons for such solicitation based on the sale of securities referenced on its website; hold, manage, possess, or otherwise handle investor funds or securities; or engage in other activities that the SEC determines.

While separate from the crowdfunding provisions, the JOBS Act also clarified that certain intermediaries in the fundraising process, such as web sites like AngelList that facilitate introductions between companies and investors, are not subject to broker-dealer registration. Section 201(c) of the JOBS Act provides that certain trading platforms involved with the sale of securities in a valid Rule 506 private placement are not subject to registration as a broker or dealer as long as certain conditions are met, including that persons receive no compensation in connection with the purchase or sale of securities and that the platform does not have possession of customer funds or securities in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.

Requirements for Issuers

Issuers utilizing crowdfunding must make financial and other information available to both the SEC and investors, both in connection with the offering and on an annual basis. The JOBS Act provides for a tiered disclosure regime based on the size of the offering, including the following:

• $100,000 or less: Income tax returns for the last fiscal year and unaudited financial statements certified as accurate by the principal executive officer.

• $100,000 to $500,000: Financial statements reviewed by an independent public accountant.

• More than $500,000: Audited financial statements.

As a practical matter, many early-stage startup companies that are considering crowdfunding may have only been recently incorporated and have not yet filed tax returns. Furthermore, many startup companies may not yet have engaged independent public accountants, nor have audited financial statements at the time they wish to raise funds.

Among other things, the issuer must file with the SEC and provide to investors and the intermediary and make available to potential investors:

• basic corporate information including name, legal status, address, and website;

• names of officers and directors (and any persons occupying similar status or performing similar functions);

• names of any holder of more than 20 percent of the shares of the issuer;

• description of the business and the anticipated business plan of the issuer;

• description of the stated purpose and intended use of the proceeds of the offering;

• target offering amount, deadline to reach such target amount, and regular updates relating to the issuer’s progress in meeting the target offering amount;

• the price to the public of the securities or the method for determining the price, and written disclosure prior to the sale of the final price and all required disclosures, providing investors with a reasonable opportunity to rescind the commitment to purchase;

• description of the ownership and capital structure of the issuer; and

• such other information as the SEC may prescribe.

Issuers must file annual reports with SEC and provide to investors reports of results of operations and financial statements as the SEC determines. However, many private companies wish to protect such sensitive financial information and may be disinclined from utilizing the exemption for this reason.

Furthermore, issuers may not advertise the terms of the offering except through notices that direct investors to the broker or funding portal. Compensation of intermediaries will be subject to rules designed to ensure that recipients disclose receipt of compensation.

In addition, the JOBS Act specifically authorizes an investor in a crowdfunding transaction to bring a civil action against an issuer for material misstatements or omissions in disclosures provided to investors. Such an action is subject to the provisions of Section 12(b) and Section 13 of the Securities Act.

The crowdfunding exemption will not be available to foreign companies, SEC reporting companies, investment companies, and companies excluded from the definition of investment company by virtue of Section 3(b) or 3(c) of the Investment Company Act of 1940.

The SEC is directed to promulgate disqualification provisions under which an issuer is not eligible to offer securities pursuant to new Section 4(6) of the Securities Act and brokers or funding portals shall not be eligible to effect or participate in crowdfunding transactions.

Coordination with State Law and Other Exemptions

Securities acquired pursuant to the crowdfunding provisions will be exempt from registration or qualification under state blue sky laws. In addition, states may not require a filing or a fee for crowdfunding securities except for the state of the principal place of business of the issuer or the state in which purchasers of 50 percent or greater of the aggregate amount raised are residents. However, the crowdfunding provisions preserve state enforcement authority over unlawful conduct by intermediaries and issuers and with respect to fraud or deceit.

While the JOBS Act specifically states that the crowdfunding amendments to the Securities Act are not to be interpreted as preventing an issuer from raising capital through other methods, it is unclear in practice how this will work. Private placements conducted through Regulation D-the most common type of private offering transaction-may be integrated with other offerings conducted within six months. Absent SEC clarification, significant questions regarding integration may inhibit a crowdfunding transaction at the same time as an angel or venture capital-led transaction with accredited investors is being conducted.

In addition, the SEC is directed to issue a rule to exclude persons holding crowdfunding securities from the shareholder threshold for registration under Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

SEC Rulemaking

The crowdfunding provisions of the JOBS Act require significant SEC rulemaking, which is supposed to occur by December 31, 2012. In addition to specific areas that the SEC is supposed to address through rulemaking, the SEC is given wide discretion to prescribe various requirements on intermediaries and issuers for the protection of investors and in the public interest. The SEC has begun accepting public comments on regulatory initiatives under the JOBS Act, including the crowdfunding provisions.

SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro has publicly stated that the proposed rulemaking deadlines in the JOBS Act do not provide sufficient time for the SEC to consider and adopt rules under the act. Given these statements, it is not clear when companies actually will be able to take advantage of all of the provisions of the JOBS Act, including the crowdfunding provisions. Given the extensive SEC rulemaking required by the JOBS Act, and the investor protection issues involved, it is unclear whether the SEC will meet the deadline.

Raising Capital Apart from Crowdfunding

Other provisions of the JOBS Act provide opportunities to enable capital raising other than through crowdfunding. For example, Section 201(a)(1) of the JOBS Act directs the SEC to amend Rule 506 to make the prohibition against general solicitation or general advertising contained in Rule 502(c) inapplicable to offers and sales under Rule 506 provided that all purchasers are accredited investors. Section 201(b) amends Section 4 of the Securities Act to provide that offers and sales exempt under Rule 506 as revised by Section 201 “shall not be deemed public offerings under the Federal securities laws” as a result of general advertising or general solicitation. Section 201(a) requires the SEC to amend both Rule 506 and Rule 144A not later than 90 days after enactment of the JOBS Act. Therefore, after SEC rulemaking is complete, it may be easier for issuers to advertise Rule 506 offerings and raise capital through the sale of securities to accredited investors.

What the Crowdfunding Provisions Mean

First, companies should not try to utilize crowdfunding until the SEC finalizes rulemaking. Doing so would violate the securities laws and, in view of the “bad actor” provisions in the JOBS Act, may preclude a company from subsequently utilizing crowdfunding to raise capital.

Second, crowdfunding will clearly expand the options available to small companies seeking financing. As some early-stage startup companies have used Kickstarter to fund pre-sales of products, some startups may choose to use crowdfunding as an alternative to more conventional sources of funding.

Third, companies seeking to raise capital through crowdfunding will need attorneys involved to ensure that their corporate housekeeping is in order. Companies will need to ensure that an appropriate number and type of shares is authorized and review provisions relating to voting rights, board composition, and other matters that may be affected when the number of stockholders increases. In addition, companies will need to consider whether they will want their stockholders to enter into agreements imposing restrictions on share transfers, such as a company right of first refusal or IPO-related lock-up provisions. Furthermore, with a large number of stockholders, companies may want to review their director and officer indemnification provisions, and consider obtaining director’s and officer’s liability insurance.

Fourth, companies will be required to make filings with the SEC. Although these filings will be less burdensome than the filings required by public companies, they may still impose burdens on the resources of small companies, and may subject the companies and their officers and directors to potential liability if not properly prepared.

Fifth, many companies may be unable to prepare disclosure documents in compliance with the crowdfunding provisions of the JOBS Act. The SEC may use its rulemaking authority to prescribe a format, such as the Form 1-A Regulation A offering statement and the model offering circular contained in the form, which may impose a significant burden to raising a small amount of money.

Sixth, the increase in number of stockholders as a result of crowdfunding may result in increased administrative burdens on issuers. Stockholders may call or e-mail company personnel with questions or request meetings and may seek to avail themselves of rights to attend and participate in stockholder meetings and to inspect corporate books and records. Should litigation arise, it may be more challenging to manage such actions as the number of stockholders increases. In addition, if an issuer is the target of an acquisition, having a large number of stockholders may complicate securities law compliance.

Seventh, companies will need to choose intermediaries carefully. While some intermediaries’ websites have already begun to prepare for crowdfunding, the transaction fees charged by intermediaries have not yet been determined and there is the risk that fees will be excessive or that unscrupulous persons will masquerade as registered intermediaries.

Finally, it is possible that the attention given to crowdfunding may result in more elaborate schemes to defraud the public. Although the SEC will likely establish strict regulations on issuers and intermediaries, the perception that crowdfunding is legitimate may encourage unscrupulous persons to spam the public with various fraudulent crowdfunding opportunities not in compliance with the crowdfunding provisions of the JOBS Act. This may range from fraudsters operating fraudulent intermediaries to directly soliciting investments in fraudulent businesses.

Filed Under: General

What are the terms of Yuri Milner/SV Angel’s Start Fund $150K investment into Y Combinator companies?

January 31, 2011 By Yokum 9 Comments

On January 28, 2011, Yuri Milner and SV Angel announced that their Start Fund would offer all Y Combinator companies $150K in convertible debt.  Reactions are mixed, from “no big deal,” to “disrupting angel investing” to “you’d be crazy not to take this deal” to “facilitating a bubble” to “strategic perfection.”  TechCrunch reports that within 24 hours, 36 of the 43 companies had already signed the convertible debt documents.

I had a chance to review the terms of the convertible debt documents used in the transaction.

Below are the major points:

Interest rate:  higher of 2% or AFR (applicable federal rate).  (I think the intention to keep the interest rate as low as possible.  In the past, interest rates on convertible debt seemed to be in the 7% to 10% range, but I recently saw a VC fund offer $500K of convertible debt at a 3% interest rate.)

Maturity date:  two years or maturity date of other convertible notes.  (This also seems to be fairly company favorable as most convertible debt seems to have a one year term.)

Automatic conversion:  on a $1M equity financing with no conversion discount and no price cap, provided that the transaction documents provide for a right to purchase a pro rata share of future financings.  (I don’t know how to get a better deal than this.)

Optional equity conversion:  on other equity financings with no conversion discount and no price cap.  (Once again, I don’t know how to get a better deal than this.)

Optional maturity conversion: into Series AA Preferred Stock based on a $5M valuation.  The Series AA has a 1x non-participating liquidation preference, weighted-average anti-dilution, basic protective provisions (adverse changes to the Series AA, number of shares of Series AA, or merger/asset sale), right to maintain proportionate ownership, ROFR/Co-Sale rights and basic information rights.  (Please note that these are generally the terms of the Series AA Preferred Stock financing documents that Y Combinator previously published.)

Optional change of control/IPO conversion:  into common stock at the lesser of (A) fair market value (based on change of control or IPO), or (B) $5M valuation.

I can’t think a good reason to turn down this deal, unless a company is never planning to raise outside investment.  Congratulations to the Y Combinator companies that are benefiting from these terms.

Update:  In the second batch of YC companies, a “most favored nation” clause was added so that StartFund receives the benefit of terms negotiated by later convertible debt investors.

Filed Under: Convertible note

Is convertible debt with a price cap really the best financing structure?

January 9, 2011 By Yokum 10 Comments

It’s been a while since I’ve written a substantive post.  (I started writing this post in September 2010, but only got around to finishing it.)

Convertible debt with a price cap seems to be the preferred structure for early-stage financings

Over the last 12 months, I’ve noticed a trend where early-stage startup companies raise seed financings of between $250K and $1M using a convertible note with a price cap.  In fact, it seems very rare to see a convertible note without a price cap these days, although it was fairly common to raise convertible debt without a price cap a couple of years ago.

Paul Graham has sparked some discussion on the topic in August 2010 when he tweeted “Convertible notes have won. Every investment so far in this YC batch (and there have been a lot) has been done on a convertible note.”

Seth Levine asks, “Has convertible debt won?”  Seth points out that “the convert cap reflects a premium to the current fair market value of the business. One super-angel I talked to told me that while a year ago these caps “approximated what I’d pay in equity” that they’re now “33% higher than what I’d normally agree to pay now.”

I have also heard that many of the companies in the YC batch that Paul Graham was referring to have been dictating convertible debt terms with price caps in the high single digit million range when pitching to angel investors.  This leads me to believe that there is a mini-bubble in the early stage financing universe.

Is a priced Series A financing a valid alternative?

A logical alternative to convertible debt is a priced Series A preferred stock financing. Mark Suster does a good job analyzing whether convertible debt is preferable to equity, and concludes that convertible debt is better. I’ve pondered the issue of convertible debt vs equity and come to the same conclusion.  Most commentators generally seem to be concluding that convertible debt with a price cap is better than a priced Series A round.

However, Ted Wang points out that Series Seed documents are better than capped convertible notes.  (I’ve used the Series Seed documents twice in the last six months and have managed to keep company-side legal fees under $15K on both of the deals, although I suspect that the documents for the “real” Series A financing will end up being more painful to draft as the Series Seed documents don’t scale well in later rounds.)  Fred Wilson, while he doesn’t endorse the Series Seed documents, says that Union Square Ventures has never participated in a convertible note deal.  Jason Mendelson points out that the use of debt fundamentally changes the fiduciary duties of managers and board members of the company, as executives and directors of “insolvent” companies face potential suits from various creditors.

Tweaking convertible debt so that common stock (instead of preferred stock) is issued for the conversion discount in order to limit liquidation preference overhang

Given that convertible debt with a price cap seems to be firmly entrenched these days as a typical structure for early-stage financings, I’ve pondered some methods to make the structure more favorable to companies.

One issue that has bothered me is that the conversion discounts and price caps result in a company creating more liquidation preference than the amount of money that investors have invested.  For example, if the amount of money raised in the convertible debt financing is large (say $1M), and the conversion discount is 50% (or the price cap is 50% of the Series A valuation), then the company will end up issuing $2M (+ interest) of Series A preferred stock to investors that only paid $1M.  This Series A preferred stock will typically have a 1x liquidation preference, so $2M of liquidation preference overhang will be created as a result of the conversion discount/price cap.

Thus, a company is in a worse situation by using convertible debt with a price cap than if the company simply did a Series A financing at the price cap valuation instead of the convertible debt.

Please keep in mind that there are two principal economic features of preferred stock:  the liquidation preference, and the equity on an as-converted to common stock basis.  Convertible debt with a price cap preserves the investor’s “equity” ownership, but gives the investor extra liquidation preference.

In order to solve this problem, I have resorted to modifying the conversion discount formula in certain deals so that the conversion discount is paid in common stock.  In other words, the principal and interest on the convertible debt will convert into preferred stock with no discount, and the discount portion will converted into common stock valued at the preferred stock price. This is an attempt to make convertible debt with a price cap economically equivalent to a priced Series A financing.

One might note that this is not the exact economic equivalent, as the application of the anti-dilution formula on the preferred stock issued upon conversion of the debt will not be as favorable as if the convertible debt financing was originally done as preferred stock. However, many seed equity financings don’t provide for anti-dilution protection, as the valuations are low to begin with.

[Note: A better way to make convertible debt identical to a seed financing is to have the convertible debt convert into its own series of preferred stock.  In other words, the new investors would purchase Series A and the convertible debt would convert into Series A-1 with an aggregate liquidation preference equal to the principal and interest of the debt (and a liquidation preference per share lower than the Series A price per share).  However, most people don’t like the messiness of creating an extra series of preferred stock.]

[Please also note: It probably doesn’t make sense to entirely focus on the equivalent theme, as there are plenty of other ways that convertible debt and equity are different. For example, convertible debt has no voting rights, and typically don’t have protective provisions. However, seed investors don’t seem to mind the lack of these features.]

An example of a term sheet provision to provide for the conversion discount to be paid in common stock and the math involved is below.

Term sheet excerpt:

CONVERTIBILITY:        In the event the Company consummates, prior to the Maturity Date, an equity financing pursuant to which it sells shares of its preferred stock, which are expected to be Series A Preferred Stock (the “Preferred Stock”), with an aggregate sales price of not less than $[1,000,000], excluding any and all indebtedness under the Notes that is converted into Preferred Stock, and with the principal purpose of raising capital (a “Qualified Financing”), then all principal, together with all accrued but unpaid interest under the Notes, shall automatically convert into shares of the Preferred Stock and the Company’s Common Stock at the lesser of (i) 80% of the price per share paid by the other purchasers of Preferred Stock in the Qualified Financing and (ii) the price obtained by dividing $5,000,000 by the Company’s fully-diluted capitalization immediately prior to the Qualified Financing (the “Discounted Purchase Price”).  The total number of shares of stock that a holder of a Note shall be entitled to upon conversion of such holder’s Note shall be equal to the number obtained by dividing (i) all principal and accrued but unpaid interest under such Note by (ii) the Discounted Purchase Price (the “Total Number of Shares”).  The Total Number of Shares shall consist of Preferred Stock and Common Stock as follows (see also example on Exhibit A):

The number of shares of Preferred Stock shall be equal to the quotient obtained by dividing (i) all principal and unpaid interest under the Note by (ii) the same price per share paid by the other purchasers of the Preferred Stock in the Qualified Financing (such price, the “Undiscounted Purchase Price,” and such number of shares, the “Number of Preferred Stock”).

The number of shares of Common Stock shall be equal to (i) the Total Number of Shares minus (ii) the Number of Preferred Stock.

Example:

Assumptions:

Principal + Interest    $1,000,000
Discounted Purchase Price    $1.00
Undiscounted Purchase Price    $2.00

Total Number of Shares:

Principal + Interest ($1,000,000)        =    Total Number of
Discounted Purchase Price ($1.00)        Shares (1,000,000 shares)

Number of Preferred Stock:

Principal + Interest ($1,000,000)        =    Number of Preferred
Undiscounted Purchase Price ($2.00)        Stock (500,000 shares)

Number of Common Stock:

Total Number of Shares             –    Number of Preferred          =    Number of Common
Shares (1,000,000 shares)            Stock (500,000 shares)    Stock (500,000 shares)

Filed Under: Convertible note

Can a California company have unpaid interns?

April 15, 2010 By Yokum 10 Comments

(The following is from a WSGR client alert.)

On April 7, 2010, the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) issued an opinion letter addressing the requirements employers must meet in order to have unpaid interns in compliance with California law. Although widely published news reports, including a recent New York Times article analyzing the DLSE’s April 7th opinion letter, have raised hopes that California is relaxing its position with respect to the permissibility of unpaid internships, such optimism appears to be misplaced and employers must continue to exercise caution in this area.

The DLSE’s guidance is timely, as thousands of college graduates and students prepare to hit the job market in search of employment opportunities. Many employers offer internships for a variety of reasons, including providing useful “real world” experience to students seeking to learn more about a particular industry or profession, and trying to help the children of customers, business colleagues, or friends. However altruistic their reasons, employers must be aware that California and federal law severely limit the circumstances under which such internships can be unpaid.

In response to a letter from an attorney representing Year Up, Inc., (a program aimed at developing fundamental job and technical skills in information technology for 18- to 24-year-olds) about the classification of internships in California, the DLSE concluded that the interns enrolled in the internship program were not employees under California law, and therefore were exempt from coverage under California’s minimum wage law. In reaching its conclusion, the DLSE followed the federal Department of Labor’s (DOL’s) criteria for determining whether the interns were exempt from minimum wage coverage and examined the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding their activities. Ultimately, the DLSE’s opinion letter reiterated its longstanding position that California follows the same stringent federal factors in analyzing the classification of interns, and thus serves as a reminder to employers that improper classification of employees as unpaid interns can be costly.

The DOL has articulated six criteria to determine whether an “intern” or “trainee” is exempt from the Fair Labor Standard Act’s minimum wage coverage. In order to qualify as an unpaid internship, all six factors must be satisfied under state and federal law. The six criteria are as follows:

1. The training, even though it includes actual operation of the employer’s facilities, is similar to that which would be given in a vocational school.

2. The training is for the benefit of the trainees or students.

3. The trainees or students do not displace regular employees, but work under their close observation.

4. The employer derives no immediate advantage from the activities of the trainees or students, and, on occasion, the employer’s operations actually may be impeded.

5. The trainees or students are not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of the training period.

6. The employer and the trainees or students understand that the latter are not entitled to wages for the time spent in training.

The DLSE’s new opinion letter concluded that all six criteria also must be satisfied in California. However, the agency now appears to take a more relaxed approach as to when an employer will meet certain aspects of the six factors. For example, in determining whether regular employees are displaced (i.e., the “non-displacement” criterion), the DLSE now takes the position that occasional or incidental work by an intern should not defeat the exemption provided such work does not intrude into activities that could be performed by regular workers and effectively displace them. As the stringent six criteria must still be satisfied, it will be difficult for companies, particularly for-profit companies, to have properly classified unpaid interns. The recent New York Times article regarding internships quoted Nancy J. Leppink, the acting director of the federal Labor Department’s Wage and Hour Division, as stating, “There aren’t going to be many circumstances [where for-profit companies can have unpaid internships and] still be in compliance with the law.”

Many companies have relied upon unpaid interns as a way to minimize costs and provide opportunities to eager workers who are willing to work for free in hopes of ultimately securing a paid position. Such an approach is risky, and employers must understand that the consequences of utilizing unpaid internships that do not comply with applicable law are potentially grave. As with misclassification of an employee as an independent contractor, employers with misclassified unpaid interns face potential liability for unpaid wages and violations relating to failure to pay minimum wage, which could be significant for a full-time intern. In addition to the wages due to unpaid interns, the employer could face potential liability for overtime and missed meal or rest periods. Moreover, the employer could be liable for various penalties under California’s Labor Code (including waiting-time penalties for failing to pay wages on a timely basis), as well as unpaid employment-related taxes owed to governmental agencies.

For more information about legal issues regarding interns, please contact Fred Alvarez, Kristen Dumont, Laura Merritt, Ulrico Rosales, Marina Tsatalis, Alicia Farquhar, or another member of the firm’s employment law practice.

Filed Under: General

How do the sample Series Seed financing documents differ from typical Series A financing documents?

March 14, 2010 By Yokum 13 Comments

After the recent announcement of the Series Seed Financing documents by Marc Andreesen, Brad Feld points out that there are now four sets of “open source” equity seed financing documents:

  • TechStars Model Seed Funding Documents (by Cooley)
  • Y Combinator Series AA Equity Financing Documents (by WSGR)
  • Founders Institute Plain Preferred Term Sheet (by WSGR – disclaimer, I represent the Founders Institute and was involved in drafting this document)
  • Series Seed Financing Documents(by Fenwick & West)

My general opinion is that anything that makes the financing process faster and easier or otherwise educates entrepreneurs is a good thing.  (A reminder that anything I write on this site is only my personal opinion and does not represent the views of WSGR or anyone else from WSGR.)  In addition, I think that a “peace treaty” between early-stage investors and startup companies on standard terms (at least at a term sheet level) is a step in the right direction.

I previously wrote a post titled “How do the sample Y Combinator Series AA financing documents differ from typical Series A financing documents (or what’s the difference between seed and venture financing terms)?”  Much of the commentary on the Y Combinator documents is also applicable to the Series Seed documents.  (In fact, I recyled part of that post in writing this post.  I also reviewed the TechStars documents last year and they are similar in concept to the Y Combinator documents as the chart below indicates.)

This post assumes that you have a basic understanding of Series A financing terms.  If you don’t, please educate yourself on this site, Venture Hacks and the term sheet seriesby Brad Feld/Jason Mendelson, among other places. If you really want to understand the nuances in venture capital financing documents, please review the NVCA model venture capital financing documents. 

What situations should the Series Seed documents be used in?

The Series Seed documents are probably fine in situations where the investor (i) wishes to purchase equity rather than convertible debt, (ii) is otherwise somewhat indifferent on terms other than percentage ownership of the company, liquidation preference and right of first offer in future financings, (iii) is investing at a fairly low valuation (i.e. a couple of million dollars), and (iv) is only investing a small amount (i.e. under $500K).

I was actually somewhat surprised that the following investors have agreed to use the Series Seed documents in certain of the their deals:  Baseline, Charles River Ventures, SV Angel (Ron Conway), First Round Capital, Harrison Metal Capital, Mike Maples, Polaris Venture Partners, SoftTech VC and True Ventures. In contrast, Fred Wilson says while he is “hugely supportive of his intent here, I can’t and won’t get behind the Series Seed forms because they leave out some critical stuff that we simply won’t do a deal without.” 

I think that there are certain situations where the Series Seed and other stripped down equity financing documents might be appropriate, but I know that there are lots of situations where early-stage investors probably wouldn’t agree to the Series Seed terms.

Recently, I have seen a lot of seed stage financings being structured as convertible debt with a price cap, which is an alternative to the equity financing contemplated by the Series Seed documents. Certain angel investors refuse to do convertible debt deals, but will be okay if there is a price cap. In fact, I have seen convertible debt used to raise up to $1.0 million, but it seems like the sweet spot is around $500K.  Convertible debt documents are generally much more simpler to draft and read than equity financing documents, so I typically recommend convertible debt for companies raising below around $750K.

In my experience, if a company is raising, say $1.0 million, the investors expect to receive a full set of Series A documents with rights essentially the same as venture capital investors.  Therefore, the Series Seed documents may not be acceptable in these situations.  I think that the Series Seed documents are probably most appropriate in a friends and family equity seed financing, as opposed to a round led by a professional investor.

Why is it called Series Seed?

To differentiate it from typical “Series A” preferred stock, which comes with certain expectations with regard to rights.  There is no real rule to what a particular series of preferred stock is called.

What rights does the Series Seed have?

Ted Wang explains most of the highlights of the documents.  The primary rights in these documents, ranked in order of importance in my opinion are:

  • Non-participating preferred liquidation preference.  The investor receives their money back and the remainder goes to the common. 
  • Limited protective provisions.  Among other things, the company can’t be sold without consent of a majority of the Series Seed.
  • Future rights.  If new investors get better rights in a future equity financings (such as registration rights, price-based anti-dilution, redemption rights, etc.), then the holders of the Series Seed get these better rights.
  • Right of first offer on future financings.  Self-explanatory.
  • Board seat.  The Certificate of Incorporation gives the Series Seed a board seat, while the common get two board seats. 
  • Information rights.  The investor receives unaudited annual and quarterly financial statements.
  • Drag along.  The Series Seed documents include a fairly harmless drag-along provision, which requires the investors and the key common stockholders to vote in favor of a “deemed liquidation event” (which basically means sale of company transaction) if a majority of the holders of common stock, a majority of the holders of the Series Seed and the board approve the transaction.  Given the general theme of the documents to eliminate unnecessary provisions, it strikes me as somewhat odd that there would be a drag-along. If I represent investors in a later Series A financing, I would probably use the existence of the drag-along as an excuse to implement a more aggressive drag-along provision — which does not require the approval of the holders of common stock to trigger.
  • Legal fees.  The company is obligated to pay $10K for investors counsel.  I suspect that this seems reasonable if there is basically no due diligence due to the early stage of the companies.  (By the way, the TechStars documents and the Y Combinator documents do not have a provision to reimburse counsel for the investors, probably on the theory that the situation where the documents are used don’t require counsel to review the documents on behalf of the investors.)

What are the primary rights that are missing from the these documents that would be in a typical Series A financing?

In the Series Seed documents, there are various terms that are missing that one would typically expect in a company-friendly Series A term sheet.

  • Dividend preference.  Almost all startup companies don’t declare dividends, so deletion of a dividend preference is irrelevant to an investor.  The only practical situation that I can think of where a dividend preference is beneficial to a stockholder is where a company does a partial sale of assets and wishes to distribute the proceeds to stockholders. The liquidation preference would not apply in this situation, and any distribution to stockholders would trigger the dividend preference.
  • Registration rights.  As a practical matter, I don’t think that investors should really care about registration rights.
  • Anti-dilution protection.  Deleting anti-dilution rights saves several pages of text in the Certificate of Incorporation. Given that the Series Seed is issued at a fairly low valuation, anti-dilution protection is probably not that important, as a “down round” from a low valuation in the Series Seed is unlikely.
  • Comprehensive protective provisions.  The Series Seed documents are fairly light on protective provisions compared to a typical Series A financing.
  • Co-sale rights.  These rights are missing, which is probably okay since I have never heard of a co-sale right being used before.
  • Voting agreement.  In a typical venture financing, there is a voting agreement that governs how specific board seats will be filled.  In angel financings, I typically eliminate the voting agreement anyway and simply have a closing condition that the board consist of certain persons.
  • Comprehensive representations and warranties.  The Series Seed Stock Purchase Agreement has fairly limited reps and warranties.  As a practical matter, investors don’t sue companies for a breach of reps and warranties, so reps and warrants basically serve to flush out diligence issues.  In an early stage company, extensive reps and warranties are probably unnecessary.
  • Legal opinion.  A company counsel legal opinion is missing in these documents.  A legal opinion for a newly-incorporated early stage company probably doesn’t add much to the due diligence process and is probably unnecessary compared to the incremental cost to prepare.

Why will or why won’t people adopt the Series Seed documents?

  • Investor pressure.  The only way that the Series Seed documents will be widely used is if investors demand use of the documents.
  • Investors want additional protections. I suspect that things like lack of anti-dilution protection, a desire to have participating preferred stock and weak protective provisions will make it difficult for some investors to agree to use the documents without modification.  Once you start making substantial changes to the forms, then I think some of the value of standardization goes away.
  • Law firm resistence.  As a reference point, WSGR generally does not use the NVCA documents in a Series A financing when it represents the company unless the investor specifically demands that the NVCA documents be used.  This represents approximately 20% of all venture financings in the U.S. I’ve read the WSGR form Series A documents hundreds of times (and probably have most of the provisions memorized).  I think I’ve only come across the NVCA forms a couple of times, and both times were on deals with Boston-based company counsel, where use of the NVCA documents is more widespread.  In addition, WSGR’s Series A documents can be created using the document automation software behind the WSGR term sheet generator. Therefore, using WSGR form documents when I represent a company is much more efficient than using the NVCA documents.
  • Drafting issues in later rounds. One thing that I don’t like about stripped down documents is that adding provisions in the future is painful — especially if the documents are not written in a modular fashion.  For example, adding in the anti-dilution provisions into the Series Seed documents requires the insertion of a couple of pages of text into the Certificate of Incorporation.  It’s somewhat painful to ensure that all of the section references (including Microsoft Word auto-reference codes) and defined terms work properly.  Therefore, in my opinion, it’s actually more difficult to add the modular sections than it would be to start from a new robust template and tweak it to fit the term sheet.  I’d encourage the Series Seed project to have redlines of at least the Series Seed Ceritificate of Incorporaiton against the form of Series A Certificate of Incorporation that it was based on in order to show that the documents can easily be modified in a Series A financing to include anti-dilution and other provisions.  (It seems like the Series Seed Certificate of Incorporation is mostly based on the NVCA form of Certificate of Incorporation with various formatting and simplification-related changes.)
  • Use of different forms for later Series A financing.  As a practical matter, in a typical Series B financing, the Series A documents will generally be tweaked slightly for the Series B, and company counsel will send redlines to investor counsel to show changes from the Series A (which are typically minimal).  When a company does a Series A financing and the Series Seed documents are in place, the Series Seed Stock Purchase Agreement and Investors Rights Agreement will probably not be re-used.  As discussed above, the Certificate of Incorporation will need to be amended and restated and various provisions will need to be plugged in.  (By the way, restated means that the entire document is redone in its entirely, as opposed to just an amendment, which might refer to discrete sections like: “Article IV shall be amended such that the number of shares of Common Stock shall be 15,000,000.”)  The Series Seed Stock Purchase Agreement has no lingering obligations, so Series A investors will want a more traditional stock purchase agreement with closing conditions and closing certificates — and it is much easier to use a typical Series A Stock Purchase Agreement than modify the Series Seed Stock Purchase Agreement.  In addition, there will be so many new provisions added to the Investor Rights Agreement (such as registration rights) that starting from a more robust form is easier than adding provisions to the Series Seed Investor Rights Agreement.

What’s the difference between the Series Seed documents, the TechStars documents, the Y Combinator documents and TheFunded Plain Preferred term sheet?

The Y Combinator documents were released in August 2008.  The TechStars documents were released in February 2009. TheFunded released their “Plain Preferred” term sheet in August 2009.  The Series Seed documents were released in March 2010.  Below are some of the material differences between the Series Seed, Y Combinator and TechStars documents.  (I won’t bother outlining the differences in TheFunded term sheet, as it was more intended for a typical Series A institutional venture capital financing, as opposed to the seed stage contemplated by the other documents.)

 

Series Seed

Y Combinator

TechStars

Name of security

Series Seed

Series AA

Series AA

Principal documents

COI, SPA, IRA

COI, SPA, IRA

COI, Subscription Agt.

Dividend preference

Pro rata with common

Silent

Pro rata with common

Liquidation preference

1x non-participating

1x non-participating

1x non-participating

Redemption rights

None

None

None

Anti-dilution

None

None

Broad-based weighted average

Board composition

2 common; 1 preferred

2 common, 1 preferred

2 common, 1 preferred (if Series AA is at least 5% of fully-diluted)

Protective provisions

Typical list for company-friendly VC financing

Changes in preferred and merger/sale of assets only

Changes in preferred only

Information rights

Unaudited annual and quarterly

Unaudited annual and quarterly

Unaudited annual

Registration rights

None

None

None

Right of first offer on new financings

Yes

Yes

Yes

Right of first refusal and co-sale agreement

Assignment of company right of first refusal to investors

Silent

Silent

Drag-along

Yes for Series Seed holders and founders. Triggered upon (i) majority of common, (ii) majority of Series Sees, and (iii) board approval.

No

No

Future rights

Yes

No

Yes

Legal opinion

None

None

None

Legal fees

$10K to investor counsel

None

None

 

What would you change about the documents?

I’m still pondering and will update this post later after I speak to some early-stage investors.

Filed Under: Series A

What is an employee retention or M&A carveout plan?

February 21, 2010 By Yokum Leave a Comment

I was speaking at an event last month to a group of CEOs and was surprised by the number of CEOs that were worried about the value of their common stock in a M&A transaction.  Due to aggregate liquidation preferences that may exceed the acquisition price in an M&A deal, common stock may be rendered worthless.  For example, if a company has raised $20M in venture financings by issuing non-participating preferred stock, the holders of common stock will not receive any proceeds from an M&A transaction unless the transaction value exceeds $20M.  If you can’t figure this out yourself, you should probably build a liquidation preference spreadsheet to model how liquidation preferences work depending on M&A transaction value.

In response to the problem of worthless common stock, some companies have implemented employee retention plans, which are also referred to as M&A carveout plans. This was particularly common from 2001 to 2003, after the dot-com crash when companies had raised a large amount of venture financing at high valuations.

Below are some common structures for employee retention plans and issues related to each alternative.  I have intentionally not covered all of the corporate law implications of designing and implementing a retention plan or provided a comprehensive analysis of any particular tax or accounting issues, as they are fairly complex and depend on specific facts.  A company’s board of directors will need guidance from counsel on meeting their fiduciary duties when implementing a retention plan.

1. Change of Control Bonus Plans

Under a change of control bonus plan, eligible employees are entitled to certain benefits upon change of control transactions as specifically defined in the plan documents.  This can be simple as an agreement with an individual employee that says “if you are still employed when the company is sold, you will receive $X.” 

More complex plans set aside a pool of money for employees and a mechanism for dividing the pool.  In addition, the plan could pay a fixed amount under the plan to the individuals, regardless of the value of the triggering event.  Alternatively, the plan could pay a percentage of the proceeds from the triggering event (e.g. 10% of the size of the deal). In some cases, the payout may be a sliding scale (e.g. 10% of the first $5M in proceeds, 15% of the next $5M in proceeds, and 20% of the amount over $10M).  In plans where the size of the payout is dependent on the size of the transaction, the definition of the transaction value needs to account for situations such as assumption of debt by the acquiror, earnouts, escrows, and illiquid stock as acquisition consideration, among other things.  In addition, given that the plan is intended to solve for situations where common stock is worthless, they should terminate above certain transaction values, or payouts should take into consideration the value of the common stock.

2. Straight Retention Plans

Under straight retention plans, eligible employees are entitled to certain benefits or payments that are not contingent upon any triggering event, such as a change of control.  These bonus payments may be paid as long as the employee is employed on a certain date (i.e. 50% of base salary if still employed 6 months later).

The following issues relate to both change of control bonus plans and straight retention plans:

• Currency. The company must determine the currency with which to pay the eligible employees. Typically, employees receive stock, cash or a combination thereof.  A retention plan that pays employees in acquiror stock is less common than a cash payment plan as payment in acquiror stock will be ordinary income to the employee, and receiving illiquid acquiror stock in a taxable transaction is not desirable in most situations.

• Participation. The company must determine which employees are eligible to participate in the program. Executive management is typically the key participant, however, participation may be determined by time of service or benefits can be given to all employees.

• Allocation. Once the company has determined who is eligible, they must further determine how to allocate the units or stock to be issued to the employees. Alternatives include position, time of service, current equity holdings or other metrics as determined by the company’s board of directors.  The board can set aside some of the “retention pool” for future issuances. However, it must determine when establishing the plan what will happen to the pool upon certain triggering events.

• Vesting. The company must determine whether the stock or cash distributed will be fully vested at the time of grant or will vest over time. The company must further determine which, if any triggers, will accelerate vesting and to what degree.

• Last Man Standing. Related to vesting issues, the company must also determine whether benefits will be forfeited if employees are terminated within a certain period of time of the change of control and whether the forfeited benefits will be redistributed to remaining employees.  If the employee needs to be employed at the time of the change of control transaction, this may lead to a perverse incentive for company management to terminate employees, especially if the forfeited benefits are redistributed to remaining company management.

3. Junior Preferred Stock

Some companies have implemented junior preferred stock, which often receives a certain percentage liquidation preference on the sale of the company.  The junior preferred can be created as an option plan or sold directly, with or without vesting.  The junior preferred is often junior to existing preferred stock, but senior to common stock, in order to provide liquidation preference for certain classes of employees, senior to common stock.  Participation, allocation and vesting issues are similar to those described above.

Filed Under: M&A

What is a convertible bridge note with a price cap?

January 11, 2010 By Yokum 20 Comments

I seem to be doing a lot of pre-Series A convertible bridge note financings these days. As I have written previously, I think that convertible notes with even large conversion price discounts (e.g. 50%) or warrant coverage are typically more company-favorable than a Series A financing where a valuation is set.  After completing a lot of convertible debt deals over the last year on behalf of both companies and investors, I have refined some of my thoughts about pre-Series A convertible debt terms.

Observation 1 — Convertible debt is a bad deal for angel investors

I think many sophisticated angel investors realize that convertible bridge notes do not adequately compensate angel investors for the risk that they take in funding early-stage companies. For example, typical provisions in a company-friendly pre-Series A convertible bridge note financing may include a 20% conversion discount from the Series A price and a 2x return on a sale of company.

Assume the angel investor invests $500K. If the company eventually raises $50M in a Series A financing at a $100M valuation, a 20% discount from that price is not particularly attractive compensation for that investment risk, as the investor would only own about 0.4% of the company after the financing (assuming that the shares issued upon conversion of the bridge were not included in the pre-money fully-diluted share number). Similarly, if the company is sold for $100M, the investor would only receive 2x their investment back (plus interest), or a total of $1M, which would only be 1% of the sale price.

If the investor had invested $500K in a Series A Preferred Stock at a $4.5M premoney valuation, then the investor would own 10% of the company. If the company raises $50M in a Series B financing at a $100M valuation, the investor would own 6.67% of the company post-Series B financing.

Similarly, if the company was sold for $100M before another round of financing, the investor would receive 10%, or $10M.

Observation 2 – Angel investors realize convertible debt is a bad deal so they demand price protection provisions (i.e. a price cap)

Due to the economic results described above, many sophisticated angel investors refuse to do convertible note bridge financings unless the conversion price on the debt is capped.  In other words, an investor may request that the conversion price is the lower of (i) a 20% discount from the Series A price, or (ii) the price per share determined if the valuation was $[X]M.  Typically, the valuation might be some reasonable projection of the valuation range in the eventual Series A financing.  The valuation is typically higher than what would be set if the investor and the company negotiated a valuation at the time of the convertible debt financing, but lower that the expected Series A valuation if the company achieved their objectives.

Similarly, in the event of a sale of company before a Series A financing, a sophisticated angel investor may request that they receive the better of (i) 2x their investment back (plus interest), or (ii) the return if they had invested their money at an $[X]M valuation.

In any event, I think that convertible debt financings are still easier to complete than a Series A financing, so a convertible note with a cap achieves the investor’s objective without the complexity of a Series A financing.

Filed Under: Convertible note

How do you find federal and state government funding opportunities for clean tech and other companies?

December 22, 2009 By Yokum Leave a Comment

[I know it’s been a long time since I posted anything, but I was recently accused of having a dead or dying blog and felt compelled to post something.]

Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati provides a powerful online tool that provides clean technology entrepreneurs and companies with a searchable, easy-to-use source for federal and state government funding opportunities and guidance on how to apply.

The publicly available tool aggregates and frequently updates the numerous financing opportunities, such as grants, loan guarantees, tax credits, and other programs, being offered by federal and state governments. Users are able to search by industry sector, as well as by state-by-state resources. The tool also includes articles by Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati attorneys on how to take advantage of governmental funding opportunities, links to useful federal and state websites, and additional firm publications such as The Clean Tech Report and relevant WSGR Alerts and press releases.

The tool may be accessed through the Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati website at http://www.wsgr.com/cleantech.

Filed Under: Series A

When do I need to incorporate a company?

July 20, 2009 By Yokum 19 Comments

[It’s been awhile since I wrote anything.  I am giving a presentation to some of the founders in TheFunded Founder Institute on incorporating their companies, so I thought I would recycle some thoughts.]

Founders of startup companies often wait to incorporate a company until they are confident that their concept is viable or fundable.  At some point, however, an entrepreneur will need to formally incorporate a company.  Several reasons exist for taking the step to incorporate.

  • More than one founder.  If there is more than one founder, the likelihood of an argument about how the equity should be split in the new company increases dramatically.  Incorporating a company and issuing stock to the founders will help prevent misunderstandings among the founders about equity splits.  Trying to clean up pre-incorporation promises to grant equity in a startup company is a painful task, especially if founders part ways before there are formal documents in place to deal with the situation.  Please keep in mind that even if a company is incorporated, founder stock purchase agreements with repurchase rights over unvested stock if founders leave are not included with the documents from typical online incorporation services.
  • Creating intellectual property.  If there is any IP created and there is more than one founder, then incorporating an entity and assigning IP to the entity is important.  Otherwise, if a founder leaves before incorporation and IP has not been assigned to the other founder or an entity, then use of IP created by the former founder may be problematic.  Once again, please keep in mind that the documents from typical online incorporation services do not contain IP assignment provisions in connection with the purchase of founders stock or separate IP assignment documents.
  • Hiring employees or third party contractors.  Although I’ve run into a situation where the former CEO of a Fortune 500 company personally paid an “employee” out of his own pocket for a year prior to incorporation while incubating an idea, most founders will need to incorporate a company if they intend to hire employees.  In addition, if an entrepreneur needs to engage third party contractors, it generally makes sense to incorporate a company so that the third party enters into an agreement with a company instead of an individual.  In addition, any IP created by the contractor can be assigned to the company instead of an individual founder.
  • Issuing stock options.  Many entrepreneurs do not have the cash to pay third parties and may partially compensate third parties by granting stock options or giving them the opportunity to purchase equity at nominal prices.  Although it is possible to have pre-incorporation agreements to grant equity upon incorporation, it is simply easier to incorporate a company and grant stock options or equity to satisfy these promises.
  • Launching a service/product and general liability issues.  One important reason for incorporating a company is to protect the stockholders against personal liability.  If a company complies with corporate formalities, creditors of the company generally cannot reach the stockholders to satisfy the company’s liabilities.  Thus, a company should generally incorporate before launching a product or a service due to potential liability issues, as the risk of liability to a founder increases with customers or users.
  • Obtaining visas.  If a non-U.S. citizen/non-permanent resident founder intends to work in the U.S. on a startup project, then the founder should work with an immigration attorney on a strategy to legally work in the U.S.  Incorporating a company and demonstrating that it is a “real” business with sufficient capital is typically a prerequisite to a visa application.
  • Starting capital gains holding period in the event of a stock sale.  If a founder sells stock of a company in a taxable transaction and it is held for greater than one year, then the capital gains tax rate is 15% for founders in the 25% tax bracket and higher. These days, it is fairly easy to develop a hit iPhone app or Facebook app and sell a company fairly quickly.  I represented a couple of Facebook app companies last year that were sold in taxable transactions.  One app was sold by an individual founder and the app was only several months old.  Unfortunately, the founder was unable to receive the benefit of long-term capital gain tax treatment on the asset sale (and ended up paying the same tax rate as ordinary income on the sale proceeds).  The other app was sold by an individual founder and the app was only several months old, but he had the foresight to incorporate a company more than a year prior to the sale and assign IP to the company.  The buyer bought the stock of the company as opposed to the app itself.  Thus, even though the app was less than one year old, the shares of stock of the company were held for greater than one year, and qualified for long-term capital gain tax treatment.
  • Funding.  Obviously, if third party investors want to invest in a startup idea, there needs to be an entity to accept the investment.  Generally, I prefer to incorporate and issue founder’s stock at nominal prices well in advance of a Series A preferred stock financing because it is difficult to justify that common stock should be priced at $0.001 per share while Series A preferred stock is issued at $1.00 per share.

Incorporating a company is a serious step that results in out of pocket costs and ongoing tax and other filing obligations. In addition, if a founder still has a day job as an employee of another company, then the founder will need to review the founder’s employment documents carefully in order to determine if there are any issues. The first step in deciding whether to incorporate or not is to discuss the situation with a competent attorney.

Filed Under: Incorporation

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